Quelle est la nature et la fonction des sentiments dans l’activité de connaissance et, plus largement, dans l’existence humaine? Cette question, massive, n’a cessé d’inquiéter la philosophie, dont l’histoire paraît à bien des égards se confondre avec celle d’une opposition entre la lucidité de la raison et l’obscurité dangereuse des passions. Si le discours philosophique n’a jamais nié l’importance des sentiments, ni leur rôle dans l’ordonnancement général de la vie humaine, ce discours est cependant empreint d’ambiguïtés, comme l’est, déjà, le (...) statut du « cœur » dans la tripartition fonctionnelle de l’âme présentée par Platon : ni réductible à la droite raison, ni relégué dans la sphère des désirs qui nous empêchent de contempler les Idées, le sentiment est cet intermédiaire allié de la raison qui met en mouvement nos réactions morales. Cette ambiguïté se retrouve à l’âge classique, lorsque le discours philosophique découvre le fonctionnement des passions et cherche les modèles scientifiques susceptibles d’en rendre compte, hésitant entre la physiologie , la géométrie , la médecine et les sciences de la nature .En faisant de l’affectivité l’une des structures fondamentales de l’existence, la phénoménologie a replacé au centre du questionnement philosophique la problématique des sentiments. Mais comment décrire ces expériences singulières – celle de l’amour, de l’angoisse, du désespoir ou de la joie – sans les confondre avec des objets? Comment donner du sens aux affects sans adopter ce point de vue surplombant des sciences de la nature, qui confond le discours des causes et celui des raisons? Comment, en d’autres termes, continuer à parler des sentiments de manière raisonnée, tout en reconnaissant que les sentiments nous font autant que nous les connaissons – tout en continuant, par conséquent, à être réceptifs à leur pouvoir de nous ébranler? (shrink)

O presente artigo busca tecer algumas considerações sobre o desenvolvimento do Subprojeto de pesquisa Formação instaurando competência que visa verificar como os processos de formação, dado ao contexto sócio-econômico atual, estão-se organizando quanto à construção da competência, demanda recente do mundo do trabalho.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is one of the terms that is used to refer to associatively induced changes in liking. Many controversies have arisen in the literature on EC. Do associatively induced changes in liking actually exist? Does EC depend on awareness of the fact that stimuli are associated? Is EC resistant to extinction? Does attention help or hinder EC? As an introduction to this special issue, we will discuss the extent to which the papers that are published in this issue (...) help to resolve some of the controversies that surround EC. We also speculate about possible boundary conditions of EC and attempt to reconcile conflicting results on the functional properties of EC. (shrink)

edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff Since its appearance in English translation in 1996, Jürgen Habermas's Between Facts and Norms has become the focus of a productive dialogue between German and Anglo-American legal and political theorists. The present volume contains ten essays that provide an overview of Habermas's political thought since the original appearance of Between Facts and Norms in 1992 and extend his model of deliberative democracy in novel ways to issues untreated in the earlier work.Habermas's theory (...) of democracy has at least three features that set it apart from competing positions. First, it combines a concern with questions of normative justification with an empirical analysis of the social conditions necessary for the realization of democratic institutions. Second, at the heart of his model is the assertion of an internal relationship between liberalism and democracy. On this account, the rights of the individual that are central to liberalism can be guaranteed only within a constitutional framework that at the same time fosters democratic rights of political participation through the public sphere. Finally, Habermas defends a conception of universal human rights that is not only sensitive to cultural differences but also calls for legal and political institutions that facilitate the cultivation of cultural and religious identities within pluralistic societies.These essays demonstrate the extraordinary power of Habermas's theory of democracy through a further engagement with Rawls's political liberalism and through original contributions to current debates over nationalism, multiculturalism, and the viability of supranational political institutions. (shrink)

In disproof of the materialist principle, that common things exist unperceived, and in defence of the New Principle, Philonous here objects that it is inconceivable that a common thing should do so. Hylas replies that, on the contrary, we can and do think of, e.g., a tree standing alone as opposed to a tree being perceived by an observer. But Philonous counter-objects to this reply that it contains a contradiction, since it asserts that we can think of something which is (...) not thought of. (shrink)

According to Berkeley, then, the unconscious process of inference of the scientist goes as follows. He notices that, when he does not have his house within visual range, he cannot see it just by wishing to; and that, when he does have it within visual range and his eyes open, he cannot prevent himself from seeing it just by wishing not to. He therefore infers that he is not the efficient cause of these sensations. But, since he holds that they (...) must have some efficient cause, he concludes that this is a congeries of "material substances," which are numerically distinct and partly dissimilar from the sensations, and which exist even when unperceived, or "externally to the mind." As a psychological theory, this seems to be at any rate plausible. (shrink)

Both these developments would have surprised Berkeley. He would have found it paradoxical that the vulgar should have rejected his vulgar immaterialism as paradoxical, since he of course believed himself to be on their side in the matter, and characterised his own philosophy as a.